ABSTRACT Recently, it has been shown that channel feedback helps to enhance the physical layer security (PLS) of communication systems. The current use of feedback focuses on generating secret keys protecting the transmitted messages, and this feedback scheme is proved to be optimal for some physically degraded channel models. In this paper, we revisit the model of the state-dependent wiretap channel with the noncausal state at the transmitter, which plays an important role in the PLS of the wireless communication systems. We propose a new feedback scheme for this model and show that the proposed new scheme performs better than the already existing secret key-based feedback scheme. The results of this paper are further explained via a Gaussian example.
I. INTRODUCTION
Though channel feedback does not increase the capacity of discrete memoryless channel (DMC) [1] , it helps to improve the receiver's decoding performance [2] . In recent years, channel feedback and artificial noise aided cooperative jamming [3] - [5] have been shown to be useful tools helping to enhance the physical layer security (PLS) of various channel models with eavesdropper(s). However, note that in some circumstances, such as Internet of Things (IoT), the artificial noise aided cooperative jamming is not a good choice due to the energy constraint of the devices [6] , hence channel feedback is of particular interest for such circumstances. Introducing channel feedback into the PLS of the communication systems was first proposed by Ahlswede and Cai [8] , where the foundation of the PLS-the wiretap channel model [7] , was revisited by considering a feedback channel from the legitimate receiver to the transmitter. Reference [8] showed that since the eavesdropper does not know the feedback, the legitimate receiver's feedback can be used to generate secret keys shared between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver, and these keys can be used to encrypt the transmitted message. Using
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jiayi Zhang. the feedback scheme in [8] , it has been shown that the secrecy capacity (channel capacity with perfect secrecy constraint) of the wiretap channel can be enhanced. Furthermore, [8] showed that this usage of feedback is optimal (achieving the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with feedback) if the channel is physically degraded (the eavesdropper's received signal is a degraded version of the legitimate receiver's). In recognition of this, [9] further pointed out that if the feedback channel can be used to transmit anything as the legitimate parties wish, the best choice of the legitimate parties is to send pure random bits (secret key) over the feedback channel. Subsequently, [10] extended the work of [9] to a broadcast situation, where two legitimate receivers of the broadcast channel independently send their secret keys to the transmitter via two feedback channels, and these keys help to enhance the achievable secrecy rate region of the broadcast wiretap channel [11] . Very recently, [12] showed that for the general wiretap channel (without physically degraded assumption), a better usage of the feedback is to generate not only key but also cooperative message from it, and this cooperative message helps the legitimate receiver to improve his decoding performance. Reference [12] showed that this new feedback scheme achieves a larger achievable secrecy rate than the already existing secret key based feedback scheme [8] does.
The state-dependent channels are useful models characterizing various wireless communication scenarios. Reference [13] first investigated the state-dependent channel with noncausal state at the transmitter, and the capacity of this channel model was found in [14] . Subsequently, [15] studied the Gaussian case of [14] , which is known as the dirty paper channel, and showed that the capacity of the dirty paper channel equals the capacity of the Gaussian channel without the state (also called interference). Later, a natural extension of the channel with noncausal state at the transmitter to the secrecy communication setting receives a lot attention. To be specific, [16] , [17] studied the discrete memoryless state-dependent wiretap channel with noncausal state at the transmitter, and proposed lower and upper bounds on its secrecy capacity. Reference [18] studied the Gaussian case of [16] (also called the dirty paper wiretap channel), and showed that the state (interference) non-causally known by the transmitter helps to enhance the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel [19] . Reference [20] extended the state-dependent wiretap channel [16] to a broadcast situation, and proposed inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region of this model. Recently, [21] introduced the secret key based feedback scheme in [8] into the physically degraded state-dependent wiretap channel with noncausal state at the transmitter [16] , and showed that this scheme is optimal for this physically degraded model. Other related works in the application of the secret key based feedback scheme [8] to various state-dependent channel models with eavesdropper are in [22] - [24] .
In this paper, we study the state-dependent wiretap channel with noncausal state at the transmitter and feedback 1 (see Figure 1) , and try to answer the following two fundamental questions:
• 1) How to extend the feedback scheme in [12] to the state-dependent wiretap channel with noncausal state at the transmitter?
• 2) For the state-dependent wiretap channel with noncausal state at the transmitter, does the hybrid feedback scheme in [12] still gain advantages over the secret key based feedback scheme used in [8] , [22] - [24] ? The main contribution of this paper includes:
• 1) We propose a new lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the state-dependent wiretap channel with noncausal state at the transmitter and feedback, which is constructed according to a hybrid feedback scheme similar to that in [12] .
• 2) From a Gaussian example, which is also called the dirty paper wiretap channel with feedback, we show that our new lower bound on the secrecy capacity is larger than the secret key based lower bound. Moreover, we find that our new lower bound achieves the secrecy capacity for some special cases. Here note that the proposed hybrid feedback scheme in this 1 The model of this paper can be viewed as the model of [21] without physically degraded assumption. paper can be used to enhance the PLS of the dirty paper wiretap channel [17] , [18] . To be specific, the dirty paper wiretap channel is useful for modeling various PLS problems, such as secret pre-coding for intersymbol interference (ISI) channel with secrecy constraint [25] , and various secure broadcasting schemes [11] , [26] - [28] . However, for the case that the eavesdropper's channel is less noisy than the legitimate receiver's, no positive secrecy rate can be achieved for the dirty paper wiretap channel. Using the hybrid feedback scheme of this paper, the positive secrecy rate is guaranteed and this secrecy rate is even larger than that of the already existing secret key based feedback scheme. Now the remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II is about the problem formulation and the main result of this paper. The achievability proof of our new lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the state-dependent wiretap channel with noncausal state at the transmitter and feedback is provided in Section III. A Gaussian example and numerical results are provided in Section IV. Final conclusions are presented in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND NEW RESULT
Notations: For the rest of this manuscript, the random variables (RVs), values and alphabets are written in uppercase letters, lowercase letters and calligraphic letters, respectively. In addition, for an event X = x, its probability is denoted by P(x). In the remainder of this manuscript, the base of the log function is 2.
Model description: In Figure 1 , the channel is discrete memoryless, i.e., the overall channel transition probability is given by
where s i ∈ S, x i ∈ X , y i ∈ Y and z i ∈ Z. The message W is uniformly distributed in its alphabet W = {1, 2, . . . , |W|}, and the state sequence S N is i.i.d. generated according to the probability P(s). Since S N is non-causally known by the VOLUME 7, 2019 channel encoder and the legitimate receiver's channel output is sent back to the transmitter, the i-th (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }) channel input
where f i is a stochastic encoding function. The legitimate receiver generates an estimationŴ = ψ(Y N ) (ψ is the legitimate receiver's decoding function), and the average decoding error probability equals
The eavesdropper's equivocation rate of the message W is denoted by
Given a positive number R, if for arbitrarily small and sufficiently large N , there exist a pair of channel encoder and decoder described above such that log |W|
we say R is achievable with weak perfect secrecy. The secrecy capacity C f s consists of all achievable weak secrecy rates, and bounds on C f s are given in the following theorems and corollary.
Theorem 1:
[x] + = x for x ≥ 0, else [x] + = 0, and the joint distribution is denoted by
P(u, v, s, x, y, z) = P(v|u, y)P(y, z|x, s)P(x|u, s)P(u|s)P(s). (7)
Proof: The lower bound R f * s is achieved by combining the binning scheme in [14] with the hybrid coding scheme in [12] , and the details about the proof are in Section III.
Remark 1: Block Markov coding is used to construct the above lower bound R f * s , and this bound can be briefly illustrated as follows. First, in each block, we split the transmitted message into two sub-messages: one is encoded exactly the same as that in the state-dependent wiretap channel [16] , and the other is encrypted by a key generated from the feedback. Then, combining the coding scheme of [12] with the binning scheme of [14] , the two sub-messages are encoded as a codeword u N . Here note that the total rate R does not exceed the main channel capacity, i.e., R ≤ I (U ; Y ) − I (U ; S). On the other hand, in each block, since the first sub-message is encoded along the lines of the coding scheme for the statedependent wiretap channel [16] , following the equivocation analysis of [16] and noticing that the total number of the codewords can be bounded by I (U ; V , Y ), the rate of the first sub-message is upper bounded by
For the second sub-message, its rate equals to the rate of the key, and according to the secret key based feedback coding scheme [8] , the rate of the key is upper bounded by H (Y |U , Z ). Hence the total rate R can be upper bounded
, and maximizing these two bounds, R f * s is achieved. The following lower bound R f * * s in Corollary 1 can be directly obtained from Theorem 1 by letting V be constant, and this lower bound can be viewed as a secret key based lower bound (application of the secret key based feedback strategy [8] to the model of Figure 1 
and the joint distribution is denoted by
P(u, s, x, y, z) = P(y, z|x, s)P(x|u, s)P(u|s)P(s). (9)
Remark 2: Note that [21] determines the secrecy capacity of the physically degraded state-dependent wiretap channel with noncausal state and feedback by using the secret key based feedback strategy, and the secrecy capacity C f sd is given by
where the joint distribution satisfies
P(u, s, x, y, z) = P(z|y)P(y|x, s)P(x|u, s)P(u|s)P(s). (11)
We should point out that our rate R f * * s in (8) reduces to C f sd if its joint distribution satisfies (11) . To be specific, first, note that (11) indicates the existence of the Markov chain
where (1) is from the data processing theorem (I (U ; Y ) ≥ I (U ; Z ) always holds if U → Y → Z forms a Markov chain), and (2) is from the Markov chain U → Y → Z . Finally, substituting (12) into (8), it is easy to see that R f * * s is exactly the same as C f sd . Hence we see that the capacity result in [21] is included in Corollary 1 of this paper.
Besides the above lower bounds on C 
P(u, s, x, y) = P(y|x, s)P(x|u, s)P(u|s)P(s). (14)
Proof: Since C f s cannot exceed the capacity of the model of Figure 1 without eavesdropper, we know that C f s is upper bounded by the capacity of the state-dependent channel with noncausal state and feedback. In [29] , it has been shown that feedback does not increase the capacity of the statedependent channel with noncausal state at the transmitter (max(I (U ; Y ) − I (U ; S))), hence Theorem 2 is proved. The proof of Theorem 2 is completed.
In Section IV, the above proposed hybrid lower bound R f * s will be compared with the secret key based lower bound R f * * s via a Gaussian example, and we will see which feedback strategy performs better.
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, the hybrid feedback strategy for the wiretap channel [12] and the binning scheme for the state-dependent channel with noncausal state at the transmitter [14] are combined to show the achievability of Theorem 1. Now the rest of this section is organized as follows. The code-book construction and the transmission scheme are described in Subsection III-A, and the equivocation analysis of the proposed scheme is shown in Subsection III-B.
A. CODE-BOOK CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSMISSION SCHEME

Definitions and notations:
• Similar to the coding scheme in [12] , suppose that the overall transmission consists of n blocks, and the codeword length in each block is N .
• The overall message W is composed of n components (W = •
respectively. In addition, let X n = (X 1 , . . . ,X n ) be a collection of the random vectors X N for all blocks. Analogously, we have
The vector value is written in lower case letter. Code-book generation: 
• For block i (i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n − 1}), before transmission, produce a mapping g i :ȳ i−1 → {1, 2, . . . , 2 NR 2 } (this mapping is generated exactly the same as that in [8] 
where (1) is from the definition (7), which implies that • At block n, after receiving the feedbackȳ n−1 , the transmitter tries to find av n−1 (w * * n−1 , w * * * n−1 ) such that (v n−1 (w * * n−1 , w * * * n−1 ),ū n−1 ,ȳ n−1 ,s n−1 ) are jointly typical. After decoding suchv n−1 (w * * n−1 , w * * * n−1 ), the transmitter extracts w * * n−1 and tries to find a w * n such that (ū n (1, 1, 1 , w * n , w * * n−1 ),s n ) are jointly typical. If no such w * n exists, declare an encoding error. If multiple w * n exist, randomly pick out one. The codeword u n (1, 1, 1, w * n , w * * n−1 ) is picked for transmission. Decoding scheme: The decoding procedure starts from block n. At block n, the legitimate receiver chooses aū n (1, 1, 1, w * n , w * * n−1 ) which is jointly typical withȳ n . For the case that more than one or no suchū n exists, declare a decoding error. Based on the Packing Lemma [30] , this kind of decoding error approaches to zero when
After decodingū n , the legitimate receiver extracts w * * n−1 from it. Then he tries to select only onev n−1 (w * * n−1 , w * * * n−1 ) such that given w * * n−1 ,v n−1 is jointly typical withȳ n−1 . For the case that more than one or no suchv n−1 exists, declare a decoding error. Based on the Packing Lemma [30] , this kind of decoding error approaches to zero when
After obtaining such uniquev n−1 , the legitimate receiver tries to find a uniqueū n−1 such that (ȳ n−1 ,v n−1 ,ū n−1 ) are jointly typical. Based on the Packing Lemma [30] , this kind of decoding error approaches to zero when
After decodingū n−1 , the legitimate receiver picks out w n−1,1 , w n−1,2 ⊕ k n−1 , w * * n−2 from it. Note that the legitimate receiver has full knowledge of k n−1 = g n−1 (ȳ n−2 ), and hence he obtains the message w n−1 = (w n−1,1 , w n−1,2 ) . Analogously, the legitimate receiver decodes the messages w n−2 , w n−3 , . . . , w 1 , and the decoding procedure is completed. For convenience, the encoding and decoding schemes are explained by the following Figures 2 and 3, respectively. 
B. EQUIVOCATION ANALYSIS
The overall equivocation , which is denoted by = 1 nN H (W |Z n ), is given by
where (a) is due to the definitionsW 1 = (W 1,1 , . . . , W n,1 ) andW 2 = (W 1,2 , . . . , W n,2 ).
The term H (W 1 |Z n ) in (20) can be bounded by
where (b) is implied by H (W 1 |U n ) = 0, (c) is due to the construction of U n and the channel is memoryless, and (d) is due to that givenw 1 and z n , the eavesdropper attempts to find a unique u n that is jointly typical with his own received signals z n , and according to the Packing Lemma [30] , we can conclude that the eavesdropper's decoding error tends to zero if
then applying Fano's inequality,
Moreover, the term H (W 2 |Z n ,W 1 ) in (20) can be bounded by
where (e) is due to the Markov chain 
where 1 , 2 and δ approach to 0 as N goes to infinity. Substituting (21) and (23) into (20), we have
The bound (25) indicates that if
≥ R 1 +R 2 − can be proved by choosing sufficiently large n and N . Now combining (16) with (18), we have
Next, from (27) , (15) and (19), we can conclude that
Then, implied by (26) , and (19), we have
Finally applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination to remove R 1 , R 2 (R = R 1 + R 2 ), R , R , R * and R * * from (27) , (28), (29), (17), (19) , (22) and (26), Theorem 1 is proved.
IV. THE DIRTY PAPER WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH FEEDBACK
The Gaussian case of the state-dependent wiretap channel with noncausal state at the transmitter and feedback, which we also call the dirty paper wiretap channel with feedback, is depicted in Figure 4 . At time i (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }), the inputs and outputs of this Gaussian model satisfy
where X i is the channel input subject to an average power constraint P, t is a constant, and S i , η 1,i , η 2,i are independent Gaussian interference and noises and are i. lower and upper bounds on C f sg will be given in the remainder of this section.
Before we show the bounds on C f sg , define
where X is independent of S. Note that the definition in (31) is exactly the same as that in the dirty paper channel [15] .
Further define 
and
Second, substituting (31) and (30) 
and (31) and (30) , where
).
Proof: Here note that (13) is also the capacity of the state-dependent channel with noncausal state at the transmitter, and the capacity formula of its Gaussian case has been given in [15] by substituting (31) and (30) into (13) and maximizing the parameter α. Now directly using the Gaussian capacity formula in [15] , we have (41). The proof is completed.
Finally, in order to show the feedback gain, we also provide a lower bound C in sg on the secrecy capacity C sg of the dirty paper wiretap channel, see the following Theorem 6.
Theorem 6: C sg ≥ C in sg , where
, a lower bound C in s on the secrecy capacity C s of the discrete memoryless state-dependent wiretap channel with noncausal state at the transmitter is provided, and it is given by
Next, substituting (31) and (30) into (43), (42) and the lower bound C in sg on the secrecy capacity of the dirty paper wiretap channel for Q = 1, σ 2 1 = 1, σ 2 2 = 0.1, t = 0.6 and several values of P. For this case, we see that both feedback strategies enhance the secrecy rate C in sg of the dirty paper wiretap channel. Moreover, when P is small (P ≤ 15), the two feedback strategies perform the same, and their corresponding secrecy rates meet the upper bound, i.e., both feedback strategies are optimal. When P is increasing (20 ≤ P ≤ 150), the new feedback strategy performs better than the secret key based strategy, and it is the optimal feedback strategy. When P is sufficiently large (P ≥ 200), the new feedback strategy still performs better than the secret key based strategy, but it is not the optimal feedback strategy, i.e., there is a gap between the lower and upper bounds on C increasing, the maximum power P that both the two feedback strategies are optimal and the maximum power P that only the new feedback strategy is optimal are increasing.
The following Figures 9 and 10 depict the bounds on C f sg and the lower bound C in sg on the secrecy capacity of the dirty paper wiretap channel for Q = 100, σ 2 1 = 1, σ 2 2 = 20, t = 0.6 and several values of P. Comparing with Figures 7  and 8 , we see that when Q is increasing, the maximum power P that both the two feedback strategies are optimal and the maximum power P that only the new feedback strategy is optimal are increasing.
Further discussion:
In practical communication scenarios, the state (interference) of eavesdropper's channel is usually not known (stochastically known) by the transmitter, and this case is also included in the Gaussian example of this section, see 
where X i , S i , η 1,i are defined the same as those in (30) (30) , it is easy to see that if t = 0 and η 2,i = W i + η 2,i , the definitions of the two channel models are the same, which implies that the case t = 0 of (30) can be used to model the scenario that the state of eavesdropper's channel is stochastically known by the transmitter. The following Figure 11 depicts the bounds on C f sg and the lower bound C in sg on the secrecy capacity of the dirty paper wiretap channel for t = 0, Q = 1, σ 2 1 = 1, σ 2 2 = 0.01 and several values of P. Since the eavesdropper's channel noise variance σ 2 2 is smaller than the legitimate receiver's σ 2 1 + Q, without feedback, the achievable secrecy rate C in sg is zero. From Figure 11 , we see that with the help of channel feedback, positive secrecy rate is guaranteed. Furthermore, it is easy to see that the new feedback strategy achieves a larger secrecy rate than the secret key based feedback strategy does when the power P is sufficiently large.
The following Figure 12 depicts the bounds on C f sg and the lower bound C in sg on the secrecy capacity of the dirty paper wiretap channel for t = 0, Q = 1, σ 2 1 = 1, σ 2 2 = 10 and several values of P. Since the eavesdropper's channel noise variance σ 2 2 is larger than the legitimate receiver's σ 2 1 + Q, without feedback, the achievable secrecy rate C in sg is positive. From Figure 12 , we see that with the help of channel feedback, the achievable secrecy rate C in sg is enhanced. Furthermore, it is easy to see that the new feedback strategy achieves a larger secrecy rate than the secret key based feedback strategy does when the power P is sufficiently large. Finally, from Figures 11 and 12 , we see that there exists a gap between the lower and upper bounds, and eliminating this gap still has a long way to go.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new achievable secrecy rate for the state-dependent wiretap channel with noncausal state at the transmitter and feedback. From a Gaussian example (also called the dirty paper wiretap channel with feedback), we show that both the new feedback strategy and the already existing secret key based feedback strategy enhance the achievable secrecy rate of the dirty paper wiretap channel, and our new strategy performs better than the secret key based feedback strategy. Moreover, we show that the new feedback strategy is optimal for some special cases. The study of this paper offers a new option for enhancing the secrecy rates of the state-dependent wiretap channel models. 
